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ABSTRACT:  How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining?  Attempts to answer this 
question often invoke descriptors concerning the “vivacity” or “vividness” of our imaginative states.  Not 
only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other 
imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and 
contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds.  Yet however natural it may be to use 
“vividness” and cognate terms in discussions of imagination, it does not take much reflection to see that 
these terms are ill understood.  In this paper, I review both some relevant empirical literature as well as 
the philosophical literature attempt to get a handle on what it could mean, in an imaginative context, to 
talk of vividness.  As I suggest, this notion ultimately proves to be so problematic as to be philosophically 
untenable.   
 
How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining?  In attempting to answer this question, 
one sort of descriptor often invoked concerns the “vivacity” or “vividness” of our imaginative states.  
Not only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other 
imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and 
contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds.1  
 
To my mind, however, there is something deeply puzzling about these descriptors.  As natural as it may 
be to use “vividness” and cognate terms in discussions of imagination – and I myself am guilty of having 
done so in the past (see, e.g., Kind 2001) – it does not take much reflection to see that these terms are ill 
understood.  In what follows, I attempt to get a handle on what it could mean, in an imaginative context 
(and specifically, in a visual imaginative context), to talk of vividness.  As we will see, this notion 
ultimately proves to be so problematic as to be philosophically untenable.2  While most of the paper will 
be devoted to establishing this conclusion, in the final section of the paper, I reflect on its upshot.   
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, it turns out that this unrecognized confusion surrounding imaginative vivacity 
has had pernicious consequences for our theorizing about imagination. 
                                                             
1 For just a few examples where such comparisons are drawn explicitly in terms of vividness, see Scruton 1974; 
Scarry 2001, Ch. 1; Thompson 2014.  Additional examples are discussed throughout Brann 1991.  
2 Though I here focus on vividness with respect to visual imagination, I suspect a similar conclusion holds true for 
vividness with respect to imagination in other sensory modalities.   
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I.  Some Preliminaries 
In thinking about the notions of vividness and vivacity with respect to imagination, there could hardly be 
a more appropriate starting point than Hume’s Treatise.  Distinguishing between ideas and impressions 
in the opening section, Hume notes the “great resemblance” between them in all manners “except their 
degree of force and vivacity” (Hume 1739/1985: §1.1.1).  Then, turning specifically to ideas of memory 
and ideas of imagination, he re-employs similar descriptors: 
We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again 
makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when 
in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat 
intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea: or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a 
perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the 
MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION. ’Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the 
memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former 
faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are employ’d by the latter. 
When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; 
whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be 
preserv’d by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time.  (Hume 1739/1985: §1.1.3) 
Hume was not the first to treat imagination in this way, as something of a pale imitation of perception.  
A century prior, for example, Hobbes had referred to imagination as “decaying sense” (1651/1968: 88 ). 
But the Humean notions of force and vivacity have had particular resonance across the intervening 
centuries and into the present day.  That’s not to say that contemporary philosophers have embraced 
Hume’s claim that these phenomenological markers are what distinguishes imagination from memory, 
nor his claim that they are what distinguishes both memory and imagination from perception; indeed, 
philosophers tend to see both these claims as problematic.3  And rightly so.  Not only might imaginings 
sometimes be confused with memories, or vice versa, but there might also be imaginings that are yet 
more vivid or forceful than memories. Likewise, empirical studies have suggested that perceptions might 
on occasion be mistaken for imaginings (Perky 1910). But even while rejecting the idea that force and 
vivacity serve as distinguishing phenomenological marks, contemporary philosophers continue to 
employ these terms as phenomenological descriptors – whether it’s an attempt to characterize the 
“phenomenal force” of perception or to compare the vivacity of different sorts of imaginings – and there 
remains a sense that, at least typically, our perceptions are appropriately described as more vivid and 
forceful than our imaginings.4  
                                                             
3 For discussion and criticism of Hume’s use of the notions of force and vivacity, see Govier 1972, Traiger 2008, and 
Dorsch 2016.  For a contemporary discussion of memory, perception, and imagination that explores whether and 
in what ways Hume’s insights might be appropriately modified so as to be salvageable, see Byrne 2010. 
4 For contemporary discussions of perception involving force, see Pryor 2000 and Siegel and Silins 2015.  
Contemporary discussions of vivacity will be cited in the following section. 
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Despite relying heavily on the notions of force and vivacity, Hume himself does not tell us much about 
what they are supposed to mean.5  Moreover, while his initial use of these terms suggests they are 
meant to pick out two different (if complementary) phenomenological aspects of mental states, he later 
explicitly equates them: 
An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And 
this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, 
or firmness, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended 
only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, 
causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions 
and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, ‘tis needless to dispute about the terms.  
(Hume 1739/1985: Appendix) 
To contemporary ears, however, the term “force” seems to pick out something phenomenologically 
rather different from “vivacity” – even if we don’t have a precise handle on what exactly is being picked 
out  (See Brann 1991:196-7).  In a helpful discussion of Hume’s use of phenomenological descriptors for 
ideas and impressions, Trudy Govier argues that he could have overcome various objections and 
counterexamples to some of his epistemological claims had he divided  the phenomenological 
descriptors into  two categories.  In the first category, we have terms that refer to a mental state’s 
“staying power” – here we find Hume using words like strong, forceful, vigorous, steady, solid, and firm.  
In the second category, we have terms that refer to a mental state’s “clarity or amount of detail” – here 
we find Hume using terms like vivacious, vivid, lively, and intense. (Govier 1972: 45) 
I have no interest here in getting enmeshed in matters of Humean exegesis, nor will I attempt to 
evaluate the proposal Govier makes on Hume’s behalf.  Rather, I call upon her discussion largely as a 
starting point for fleshing out the notion of vivacity and situating it with respect to other 
phenomenological descriptors.  For our purposes, two things are especially important.  First, as we have 
just seen, Govier offers us a helpful suggestion for understanding the Humean notion of vivacity, 
namely, that it has to do with “clarity or amount of detail.”  Returning to the passage cited at the start of 
this paper, Govier points us especially to Hume’s claim that memory, in contrast to imagination, “paints 
its objects in more distinct colours”; ideas of imagination are instead more “faint and languid.”  (Govier 
1972: 46, Hume 1739/1985: §1.1.3)  I will consider this suggestion at greater length in Section 3, below. 
The second point that I want to highlight in Govier’s discussion concerns the association she makes 
between the notions of vivacity and vividness.  The claim of synonymy between these two notions may 
initially seem worrisome; in ordinary parlance, there’s a tendency to associate vivacity with liveliness 
while associating vividness with brightness and intensity.  For example, Dictionary.com lists “lively; 
animated; gay” as the first definition for the adjective “vivacious” and lists “strikingly bright or intense, 
as color, light, etc.” as the first definition for the adjective “vivid.”  But this does not tell the whole story.  
The second definition listed for “vivid” is “full of life; lively; animated,” and as noted by the OED, both 
                                                             
5
 Nor has the matter received much attention by Hume scholars; as Traiger notes, “There are surprisingly few 
detailed interpretations of Hume’s notion of vivacity.”  (2008: 61)  Govier 1972, which I will briefly discuss in this 
section, is one notable exception. 
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these terms trace back etymologically to the Latin vīvĕre (to live).  Moreover, like Govier, philosophers 
discussing imagination and related mental states tend to use these terms more or less interchangeably.  
To give just one representative example, consider this statement from C. Wade Savage:  “It may be 
supposed that however similar an hallucination and a perception may be, no hallucination is as vivid as a 
perception, and if the subject will only pay close attention to his experience, its vivacity will show 
whether the experience is a perception or an hallucination.”  (Savage: 269, my emphasis)  Going 
forward, I will follow this general practice and assume throughout my discussion that these descriptors 
are all aiming roughly at the same phenomenological aspect.   
But what is this aspect, exactly?  In the following two sections, I will attempt to flesh this out.  In Section 
2 I explore the psychological literature.  Given the considerable attention psychologists have paid to 
individual differences in imagistic vividness, one might expect those discussions to elucidate what such 
vividness amounts to.  Unfortunately, that expectation will not prove to be fulfilled.  In Section 3, then, I 
attempt to tackle the issue head on.  Though the notion of vividness has been widely employed in the 
philosophical literature, there have been very few comprehensive attempts to spell out what it might 
mean.  That said, the literature does contain various promising (if undeveloped) suggestions that seem 
well worth exploring.  Upon fleshing out such suggestions, however, we can see that they fail to live up 
to their promise. 
2.  Vividness in the Psychological Literature 
Perhaps the earliest psychological study focusing on imagistic vividness was conducted by Francis Galton 
in 1880.  Though Galton is today remembered more widely for his development of eugenics, his work on 
mental imagery has had considerable influence in shaping subsequent discussion of imagistic vividness.  
In what’s become known as the “Breakfast Table Questionnaire,” Galton asked 100 adult men (and, 
later, an additional 172 schoolboys) to “think of some definite object – suppose it is your breakfast-table 
as you sat down to it this morning – and consider carefully the picture that rises before your mind’s 
eye.”  (Galton 1880: 301)  He then asked a series of specific questions, including  ones focused on 
illumination, definition, and coloring: 
1. Illumination.—Is the image dim or fairly clear? Is its brightness comparable to that of the 
actual scene? 2. Definition.—Are all the objects pretty well defined at the same time, or is the 
place of sharpest definition at any one moment more contracted than it is in a real scene? 3. 
Colouring.—Are the colours of the china, of the toast, breadcrust, mustard, meat, parsley, or 
whatever may have been on the table, quite distinct and natural?”  (Galton 1880: 302) 
Reporting on the results of this survey, Galton took the answers to the questions about illumination and 
definition as indicative of vividness – he reported on his results under the heading, “Vividness of Mental 
Imagery” – and he classified the answers according to the degree of vividness they displayed.  At the 
high end, respondents described their mental imagery as “brilliant, distinct, never blotchy” and, at least 
in some instances, as being as clear and bright as normal perception.  At the low end, respondents used 
terms like “dim,” “indistinct, “incomplete,” and “vague.” 
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Almost a century later, psychologist David Marks developed an influential measure of imagery vividness 
– the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) – as part of an investigation of the relationship 
between the vividness of a subject’s imagery and the accuracy of that individuals’ ability to recall visual 
details (Marks 1973).  Having instructed subjects to visualize a familiar person or scene, Marks asked 
them to answer a series of 16 questions about the color, shape, and contours of the pictured person or 
scene.6  Answers were given according to the following scale: 
1 – ‘Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision’ 
2 – ‘Clear and reasonably vivid’ 
3 – ‘Moderately clear and vivid’ 
4 – ‘Vague and dim’ 
5 – ‘No image as all, you only ‘know’ that you are thinking of the object.’ 
 
The VVIQ and a descendant version, the VVIQ-2, have been widely used, and there have been 
considerable scientific attempts to find correlations between people’s performance on these 
questionnaires and their cognitive performance on other tasks.7  Such correlations have been taken as 
vindication of the VVIQ.  But what exactly has been vindicated?  Even assuming such correlations show 
that the VVIQ measures something functionally salient about individuals’ subjective experience of their 
visual imagery, we have not been given any reason to believe that this functionally salient property has 
anything to do with vividness.  The correlations cannot themselves provide any such reason, and they 
cannot themselves shed any light on whether the questionnaire accurately tracks anything about the 
vividness of such visual imagery as opposed to something else.  More to the point, we might naturally 
wonder how a survey instrument like the VVIQ can help teach us anything about the notion of vividness 
itself. 
 
It does not take a philosopher to note the shortcomings here.8  Calling vividness “one of the most 
irritating concepts” in imagery research, Michel Denis (1995: 136) notes that discussion surrounding the 
VVIQ leaves this concept largely undefined.9  In his view, invoking other concepts such as clarity and 
                                                             
6 It’s perhaps worth noting that Marks does not use the word “visualize” but rather asks subjects to, e.g., “Think of 
the front of a shop which you often go to.  Consider the picture that comes before your mind’s eye.”  (Marks 1973: 
24).  Analogous questionnaires have been developed for imagination in at least some other sensory modalities, 
such as olfaction (VOIQ, the Vividness of Olfactory Imagery Questionnaire) and audition (CAIS, the Clarity of 
Auditory Imagery Scale).  See, respectively, Gilbert et al 1978 and Willander and Baraldi 2010.  Since I am here 
limiting my attention to vividness with respect to visual imagination, I focus only on the VVIQ. 
7 The VVIQ-2 doubles the amount of questions asked from 16 to 32 and also reverses the scale so that a higher 
rating goes with a higher degree of vividness.  There has been considerable psychological study of the relationship 
between high imagistic vividness (as measured by the VVIQ) and accuracy of memory recall, speed of response, 
and other cognitive tasks; for discussion, see McKelvie 1995. 
8 Though for two brief philosophical reflections on this sort of problem with the VVIQ, see Schwitzgebel (2011: 52) 
and Thomas (2009: 450). 
9
 See also Cornoldi et al, who note that vividness “has been defined only intuitively as if the rating instructions 
given to subjects were based on a primitive dimension is immediately comprehensible though not wholly 
definable” (1991: 395). 
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liveliness – which are themselves poorly defined – “just postpones the issue one step further.  A mixture 
of two intuitive features hardly makes the resulting concept clearer.”  (Denis 1995: 136) 
 
To my mind, things are even worse than Denis makes out.  For it is not at all apparent that the VVIQ 
means to define vividness in terms of clarity – in fact, it would be very natural to interpret the ratings as 
stated to suggest that vividness is something separate from clarity, something to be conjoined with it 
(e.g., “Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision”), rather than as an aspect of vividness.  Indeed, 
psychologists themselves disagree about how best to interpret the notion of vividness employed by the 
VVIQ, with some taking it to have one component and some taking it to have two components (for 
discussion, see McKelvie 1995: 236-8).  Ultimately, however, what the VVIQ is measuring depends on 
how the subjects themselves interpret the notion of vividness, and we have no special reason to believe 
that they are all interpreting it in the same way as one another, or that any of them are even employing 
the notion consistently across their own introspective reports. 
 
But perhaps this conclusion is too quick.  There are two different studies here worth noting that have 
attempted to address this very issue, i.e., that have attempted to determine what notion of vividness 
underlies subjects’ responses to the VVIQ.  Cornoldi et al (1991) suggest that there are six relevant 
factors:  color, presence of a rich context, emergence of salient features, richness of detail, well-defined 
shape and contour, and the generality of the represented object.  Drawing on this work, Shinsuke 
Hishitani and Shiho Murakami take these findings to suggest that we should understand vividness in 
terms of the amount of perceptual information contained in imagery.  We find a related suggestion in 
discussions of vividness in the philosophical literature.  I take up this suggestion, along with several 
others, in the following section. 
 
 
3.  What is Vividness? 
 
As we turn to the philosophical literature in an attempt to get clearer on the notion of vividness, our 
task is made more difficult by the fact that philosophers writing on imagination tend to use the term 
“vivid” in two slightly different ways.  On the one hand, sometimes philosophers use the term “vivid 
imagining” to demarcate a particular subclass of speculative mental state.  Consider Tamar Gendler’s 
influential Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on imagination: 
 
A number of contemporary discussions of the imagination distinguish between mere 
supposition on the one hand, and engaged or vivid imagination on the other. Roughly, mere 
supposition is what is involved in simple cases of hypothetical reasoning, whereas vivid 
imagination is what is involved in aesthetic participation, engaged pretense, or absorbing games 
of make-believe.  (Gendler 2011) 
 
On this way of using the notion of vividness, being a vivid imagining is an all-or-nothing affair; a mental 
state either belongs to this class of vivid imaginings or it does not.  Moreover, “vivid” here is not being 
used as a phenomenological descriptor.  These points can be seen more clearly, perhaps, when we 
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consider that this same distinction is given different names by different philosophers, as Gendler notes.  
In distinguishing between what he calls enactment-imagination and suppositional-imagination, for 
example, Alvin Goldman seems to be drawing a similar kind of differentiation among speculative mental 
states (Goldman 2006).  Just as “enactment” is a non-phenomenological term, so too in this context is 
“vivid.”  Rather, in this first sense “vivid” is a term used to pick up a sub-class of speculative mental 
states by means of certain functional characteristics that they have, e.g., that they motivate action, give 
rise to emotional responses, generate imaginative resistance, and so on. 
 
It’s a second, different sense of “vivid” that is of interest to us here.  In this sense, philosophers use the 
term to characterize and distinguish among the imaginings that are classed as engaged/vivid/enactment 
imaginings.  Among the members of this class, some are more vivid than others.  Moreover, this second 
sense of “vivid” is a phenomenological one; it characterizes and distinguishes imaginings from one 
another on experiential grounds.   
 
The philosophical literature is rife with accounts of vivid imagining in the first sense of the term  (see, 
e.g., Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, Goldman 2006, Nichols and Stich  – to name just a few).  Such 
accounts attempt to explain the nature of imagination – in particular, the nature of a particular sub-class 
of speculative mental state picked out as vivid imagination.  Considerably less attention has been paid, 
however, to accounting for vividness in the second sense of the term.  While terms like “vivid” and its 
cognates are used to describe our imaginative experience, there have been relatively few attempts to 
provide an analysis of what this description means.10  That’s the question we aim to tackle here.  
Insofar as it seems plausible to say that imaginings vary with respect to vividness, and also to say that 
our imaginings are typically (if not always) less vivid than our perceptual experiences, how should we 
understand the notion of vividness being deployed? 
 
In what follows, I consider several different proposals for how we might answer this question.  In 
evaluating these proposals, I take us to be guided by four independent desiderata.11  First, we have the 
coherence desideratum:  the suggestion must itself be coherent.  In explaining the ill-understood notion 
of vividness in terms of some other concept, that concept itself should be well-defined.  Second, is what 
we might call the applicability desideratum.  The concept or concepts invoked to explain vividness and 
differentiate it from perceiving (and other relevant mental states) must be applicable to both imagining 
and perceiving (and other relevant mental states).  Third is what we might call the phenomenal 
difference desideratum.  The suggestion must point to something that at least typically phenomenally 
distinguishes our imaginative experiences from our perceptual experiences.  And finally, our fourth 
desideratum is what I’ll call adequacy.  It is not enough to offer a coherent suggestion applicable to both 
perceiving and imagining that picks out a phenomenal difference between these two experiences.  Not 
                                                             
10 One important exception is McGinn 2004; I discuss McGinn in more detail below.  Critical discussions of vividness 
occur in Wittgenstein (1948/1980) and Budd 1989, though both Wittgenstein and Budd are more concerned to 
show that vividness is not a useful way to distinguish perceptual experience from imaginative experience than they 
are to show that there is something inherently problematic with the notion of vividness, as I’ll argue here. 
11 My thinking about these desiderata was influenced by some very helpful comments from Fabian Dorsch. 
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just any phenomenal difference will do.  Rather, it must be a phenomenal difference that seems 
relevant to vividness itself, i.e., that captures something relevant to what we might mean by vividness.  
 
The first proposal to be considered stems from a promising suggestion we encountered earlier in 
Govier’s discussion of Hume.  For Govier, vividness concerns the “clarity or amount of detail” contained 
in an idea.  Hume is onto this notion in the opening passage of Treatise 1.1.3, she suggests, when he 
claims that memory “paints its objects in more distinct colours” than imagination; according to Govier, 
“The expression ‘paints its objects in more distinct colours’ concerns the clarity and precision of the 
idea.”  (Govier 1972: 46)  Once again setting aside matters of Humean exegesis we can consider the 
suggestion itself:   
 
CLARITY OR DETAIL:  Imaginative vividness consists in the clarity or the amount of detail of the 
imagining . 
 
Note that it’s not clear from what Govier says whether she takes “amount of detail” to be a gloss on the 
notion of clarity or whether she means it to be understood as a distinct property.  In general, however,  
the clarity of a representation can come apart from its level of detail.   A photograph of a dog might 
contain a high level of detail despite being slightly blurry, while a child’s line drawing of a dog might be 
not at all blurry but yet contain very little detail.  Thus, I’ll treat these two dimensions as distinct and 
assume that Govier means to be offering us a disjunctive definition.  In assessing its plausibility, then, it 
will first be helpful to consider the two disjuncts individually: 
 
CLARITY:  Imaginative vividness consists in the clarity of the imagining. 
 
DETAIL:  Imaginative vividness consists in the amount of detail of the imagining. 
 
In evaluating the first of these two claims, it’s worth recalling that the notion of clarity was heavily 
featured in Galton’s original Breakfast Table Questionnaire and is also emphasized in the rating scale of 
the VVIQ.  But its frequent invocation does not itself settle the issue of its relationship to vividness. 
 
Clarity is relatively well understood when it comes to perception – we have a coherent sense of what it 
means for one perceptual experience to be clearer than another.  When I first wake up in the morning 
before my aging eyes have had time to adjust, my perceptual experience of my bedside clock is slightly 
fuzzy or blurry.  When I look at it again moments later once I’m more fully awake, my perceptual 
experience is no longer fuzzy; this later perceptual experience has a higher degree of clarity compared 
to the earlier one.  Likewise, after an afternoon swim, my perceptual experience when I first get out of 
the pool is fuzzier than my perceptual experience once the water is no longer in my eyes.  Moments 
later, my perceptual experience has considerably more clarity.  And to give one more perception-related 
example:  The words on the page seem sharper and more in focus once I put on my reading glasses – 




Clarity is also relatively well understood when it comes to photography – we have a coherent sense of 
what it means for one photograph to be clearer than another.  A photograph slightly out of focus has 
less clarity than a photograph completely in focus.  Or consider editing a photograph using a digital 
photography program like Lightroom.  As the instruction manual notes, increasing the Clarity setting 
“adds depth to an image by increasing local contrast.”  (Adobe: 161)  More specifically, this setting 
adjusts the midtones in the photo;  increasing the Clarity setting will make the midtone edges more 
distinct, and this makes the whole photograph look sharper.   Interestingly, it’s a different setting – the 
Saturation setting – that allows one to make changes to what they refer to as “the color vividness or 
purity of the color.”  (Adobe: 163)  But let’s set aside that point for a moment. 
 
Do these facts about clarity derived from perception and photography apply to imagination?  If so, then 
that would suggest that when we say that one imagining has more clarity than another, or that an 
imagining has less clarity than a perceptual experience, we’re claiming that the imagining is slightly out 
of focus, or slightly fuzzy, or that it needs tuning to make it more sharp.  To my mind, however, these 
descriptions don’t ring true.  When I imagine someone or something – as when I imagine my spouse 
while he’s away, travelling for work – it does often seem natural to describe my imaginative experience 
as less clear than a typical perceptual experience of him.  But my experience in imagining his face isn’t 
fuzzy in the way my first-thing-in-the-morning perceptual experience of the clock is fuzzy, nor is like a 
photograph whose edges need sharpening.  Neither of these descriptions seem to capture the respect in 
which my imagining lacks clarity.  And it’s hard to know exactly what to say that would capture it. 
 
Although variations of clarity are well understood when it comes to photography and when it comes to 
perception, then, that understanding doesn’t easily transfer over to imagination.  This proposal thus 
falters when it comes to the coherence desideratum.  But in fact, once we push the point, this proposal 
also seems to run into trouble with respect to the applicability desideratum.  Given the discussion 
above, it is no longer obvious that clarity is the right notion to use when describing imaginings – or at 
least, it’s not the same notion of clarity that we use in other visual contexts; whatever it means for 
imaginings to lack clarity, this seems to be quite different from what it means for perceptions to lack 
clarity.  Even if CLARITY were able to meet our other two desiderata, its failure with respect to our first 
two desiderata makes it hard to see how it could give us an adequate explanation of imaginative 
vividness.  But if CLARITY is problematic than that means that the disjunctive definition CLARITY OR DETAIL is 
likewise problematic (and the same problem would infect a corresponding conjunctive definition, 
CLARITY AND DETAIL, as well). 
 
Of course, even if we reject both CLARITY and CLARITY OR DETAIL we can still consider DETAIL on its own.  
Does it do any better?  This kind of requirement is perhaps what psychologists like Hishitani have in 
mind when they try to cash out vividness in terms of the degree of perceptual information contained.  
Perhaps it is also what philosopher Alex Byrne has in mind when he suggests that imaginative content is 
typically “degraded” in comparison with perceptual content.  (Byrne 2010: 19) 
 
We might start our investigation of DETAIL by reflecting again on perception and photography.  Do some 
of our perceptual experiences have a higher level of detail, or convey more perceptual information, than 
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others?  In exploring this issue, we should first set aside those cases in which differences in detail seem 
to owe solely to differences in clarity.  When my perceptual experience of the clock is sufficiently fuzzy 
that I can’t read the time, that perceptual experience is less detailed than a perceptual experience in 
which I can read the time. In this case, however, the reason that the first experience has less detail, or 
carries less perceptual information, than the second seems to be entirely a function of the difference in 
clarity between them.  And we’ve already noted that these kinds of cases don’t seem to capture what 
we’re after. 
 
Even having set aside those cases, however, there is still reason to be careful here, since the level of 
detail of a perceptual experience depends at least in part on the level of detail in the perceived scene.  
While the clarity of a representation depends solely on facts about the representation itself, how 
detailed the representation is seems to depend both on facts about the representation and facts about 
what’s being represented.  There is, perhaps, less detail to take in when I am viewing a empty classroom 
than when I am viewing it full of students.  Likewise for the respective photographs.  But of course we 
can also imagine classrooms both empty and full, and although there is an analogous sense in which the 
first imagining will have a lower level of detail than the second, it’s hard to see how this difference in 
level of detail could be relevant to imaginative vividness. 
 
What about a perceptual experience of a dimly-lighted room, or a photograph of that same room?    
Both of these might reasonably said to be less detailed, or to carry less perceptual information, than the 
corresponding perceptual experience and photograph in full light.  Here too, however, an analogous 
problem re-arises, since we can imagine the same room in both dim light and full light, and the 
distinction between these two imaginings doesn’t seem to track what is mean to be captured by 
distinctions drawn in terms of vividness.  Similar considerations suggest that we should be pessimistic 
about a related suggestion for understanding imaginative vividness that one encounters in both the 
psychological and the philosophical literature: 
 
BRIGHTNESS:  Imaginative vividness consists in the brightness of the imagining. 
 
But though reflection on the ways that perceptual experience varies in detail does not suggest to us a 
plausible way of understanding DETAIL, the philosophical literature on imagination contains a related 
suggestion that may seem promising.  It has often been noted that imaginings can be indeterminate 
with respect to visual properties.  Consider Daniel Dennett’s example of the striped tiger (1969). Imagine 
a tiger.  Presumably, the tiger that you’ve just imagined has stripes.  But how many stripes?  Many 
people report being unable to answer the question.  Their imaginings are indeterminate with respect to 
the number of stripes.  Of course, tigers themselves always have a determinate number of stripes, and 
likewise, when you see a tiger, your perceptual experience typically represents that tiger as having a 
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determinate number of stripes.  So in this way your imagining of a tiger is less determinate – and hence 
less detailed – than your perceptual experience of the tiger.  It carries less perceptual information.12 
 
This indeterminacy is not an isolated phenomenon.  To borrow another example of Dennett’s:  Imagine 
a tall woman wearing a hat.  Once you have – and you should really make sure you’ve taken the time to 
do so before going on – consider the following questions:  What kind of hat was it?  Were the woman’s 
ears visible?  Was she sitting or standing?  Was she indoors or outdoors?  Was she wearing shoes?  Was 
she wearing a watch?  I suspect that you were able to answer some of these questions – probably you 
knew whether it was a baseball cap, or a floppy sunhat, or a beret – but I also suspect that there were 
others among the questions that you were unable to answer.  You might protest that you couldn’t 
answer the question about her shoes, say, because you only imagined her from the neck up – and the 
same kind of “indeterminacy” would affect your perceptual experience were she to be visible to you 
only from the neck up.  But note that even if you imagined her from head to toe, your imagining likely 
did not contain sufficient detail to enable you to answer whether she was wearing a watch. 
 
Understanding the notion of detail in terms of determinacy thus seems promising.  Not only is it 
reasonably well defined, but it applies to both perception and imagination.  This proposal thus seems to 
satisfy our first two desiderata.  It also does reasonably well with respect to our third desiderata about 
phenomenal difference, as the notion of indeterminacy seems to get at something true about the 
difference between perceptual experiences and imaginings.  Granted, it might not mark a sharp 
distinction between the two.  Perceptual experiences might occasionally be indeterminate in various 
respects – if I am very far away from a tiger, for example, my perceptual experience might not represent 
it as having a determinate number of stripes.  Pointing to cases like this, Colin McGinn suggests that we 
can better differentiate imagination and perception by focusing on a closely related property that is 
occasionally confused with indeterminacy, a property he calls saturation: 
 
every point in the visual field is such that some quality is manifest there, whereas this is not true 
of the image.  The percept represents the world as dense, filled, continuous; but the image is 
gappy, coarse, discrete.  I am speaking phenomenologically here: at every point of the 
phenomenal visual field you can find a manifested quality (even if that quality is on the 
borderline between two other qualities), but in the image there are points at which nothing is 
manifested – not even an indeterminate quality.  I form an image of my mother’s face, but there 
are many points at which my image is utterly silent; I just select certain features as sufficient to 
make it an image of my mother, and I leave the rest blank.  But if I see my mother’s face, there is 
no blank anywhere—there is phenomenological plenitude. ...  Thus the percept is saturated and 
the image unsaturated in this sense, there is a special ‘poverty’ in the image, to use Sartre’s 
terms.  (McGinn 2004: 25-6) 
 
                                                             
12
 For a related example involving a speckled hen, see Armstrong 1968.  For Dennett, the indeterminacy of mental 
images shows that they cannot be picture-like.  Though I think he’s right that mental images are often 
indeterminate, I do not think it supports this conclusion.  See Kind 2001. 
Page 12 
 
It’s not clear to me that saturation is really a property distinct from indeterminacy as opposed to a 
species of indeterminacy.  But for our purposes here, we need not worry much about the issue.  
Discussions of the relation between perception and imagination (and other visual states like 
hallucination) often take up the question of whether they are different in nature or only in degree, and 
also the question of whether we can draw a sharp distinction between them.  Indeed these issues play a 
key role in discussions of Hume’s invocation of force and vivacity.  But in attempting to make sense of 
the notion of imaginative vividness, we need not take a stance on these issues.  Thus, the fact that 
indeterminacy does not draw a sharp distinction between perception and imagination does not preclude 
it from being useful for our purposes here.  For indeterminacy to be an appropriate means of fleshing 
out DETAIL – for it to satisfy the phenomenal difference desideratum – it need not be the case that 
perception is never indeterminate – we need it to be the case only that imaginings vary along the 
dimension of determinacy and that they are typically less determinate than perceptual experiences, a 
claim that McGinn himself grants. 
 
Of course, in fleshing out DETAIL, we might want to throw considerations of saturation into the mix along 
with considerations of determinacy.  An imagining that is unsaturated does present less detail than a 
perception that is saturated.  So, insofar as McGinn’s claims about saturation seem plausible – that is, 
insofar as it seems plausible that perceptual  experiences are saturated in a way that imaginings are not, 
and insofar as it seems plausible that imaginings vary from one another in degree of saturation – that 
suggests that we might best understand the notion of detail in terms of both determinacy and 
saturation.   
 
Understanding DETAIL this way gives us a proposal that does very well with respect to our first three 
desiderata.  Unfortunately, however, the proposal founders when it comes to our last desideratum, i.e., 
the adequacy desideratum.  In order for DETAIL to be an acceptable proposal, it’s not enough for the 
notion of detail to be well-defined, and it’s still not enough even for imaginings to vary along this well-
defined dimension.  Rather, it must also be the case that variations in detail account for the kinds of 
variations that are meant to be picked out by characterizations in terms of vividness.  Is it because of the 
indeterminacy of my tiger imagining that it is less vivid than my perceptual experience of a tiger?  Is an 
imagining more vivid when – and only when – it’s more determinate? 
 
To my mind, the answers to both of these questions is ‘no.’  My imagining of a solid black panther may 
be more determinate than my imagining of a tiger, but that doesn’t seem to be what affects which 
imagining would typically be characterized as more vivid.  Even if the number of stripes on the imagined 
tiger is indeterminate, I might still imagine it more vividly than I do the panther.  Similarly, even if my 
imagining of the black panther is somehow fully determinate, it still seems that it might be reasonably 
characterized as less vivid to me than my perceptual experience of the panther.  Perhaps this latter 
point is easier to accept when we focus on a case where it is more plausible that the imagining is fully  
determinate – perhaps a case when we compare seeing a solid white wall (which takes up one’s entire 
Page 13 
 
visual field) with imagining that same white wall.13  So as promising as DETAIL initially seems, its failure to 
satisfy the adequacy desideratum makes it an untenable proposal. 
 
Are there other suggestions we might try?  Does vividness perhaps derive from color, one of the 
relevant factors delineated by the psychologist Cornoldi?  Following Govier, we earlier took Hume’s 
remark that memory “paints its objects in more distinct colours” than the imagination to relate to the 
clarity of imagining, but perhaps we should take it more literally – maybe it’s the color themselves that 
matter.  Likewise, though we earlier rejected BRIGHTNESS, perhaps its intuitive force derives from the 
relation between brightness and color vibrancy.  And as we also saw earlier, references to vividness in 
the context of digital photography often relate directly to color saturation and color vividness.  Of 
course, using the notion of color vividness in a definition of imaginative vividness only pushes our 
problem back a step, and we’d have to try to figure out how such a notion could be extended to non-
visual imaginings, but perhaps there is still something relating to the color intensity of our imagining that 
matters to vividness. 
 
COLOR:  Imaginative vividness consists in the color intensity of an imagining. 
 
Unfortunately, however, quick reflection suggests that COLOR fares no better than the other suggestions 
we’ve considered.  Like DETAIL, COLOR falters with respect to the adequacy desideratum.  Imaginings in 
black and white are typically characterized as just as vivid, or more vivid, than imaginings in color.  Try to 
imagine the shower scene in Psycho, for example – the knife coming at Marion Crane (Janet Leigh), as 
she screams in horror.  Now try to imagine changes to that scene – Marion ducks as the knife comes 
toward her, and she then attempts to flee.  When I do carry out these imaginings, I can do so in a way 
that would normally be characterized as vivid, but these imaginings are in black and white.  When I 
imagine my great great grandmother, who died before I was born, I might imagine her in black and 
white, perhaps in the style of old photographs, but the fact that my imagining is in black and white 
seems completely  irrelevant to whether the imagining would be characterized as vivid or not. 
 
Before concluding this part of our discussion, I’ll consider one more proposal, one that takes vividness to 
consist in an amalgam of all the features that we’ve discussed so far.  According to this suggestion, 
vividness emerges through an appropriate combination of clarity/detail/brightness/color etc. – or 
perhaps a combination of the six relevant features highlighted by psychologist Cornoldi (color, presence 
                                                             
13 Granted, there may be other related notions that could be utilized instead.  Perhaps, for example, what matters 
is not the amount of detail but the kind of detail.  Consider scientific illustrations, e.g., the sorts that are often used 
in textbooks.  Medical textbooks often utilize anatomical drawings rather than photographs, and likewise for 
botany textbooks.  It’s precisely by leaving out some detail that the drawing manages to be more helpful than the 
photograph.  By eschewing maximal detail, the drawing manages to make the included detail more salient.  
Perhaps vivid imagining works the same way, i.e., perhaps we could capture vividness in terms of salience or 
relevance of detail rather than in terms of amount of detail.  But here we are going to have to explain what make 
some details more salient or relevant than others, and it is hard to see how to do that in a non-question begging 




of a rich context, emergence of salient features, richness of detail, well-defined shape and contour, and 
the generality of the represented object) – where what matters is that enough of these rise above a 
certain threshold, even if others remain below it.  Just as digitally editing a photograph to make it more 
vivid might involve tuning it along several different dimensions, so too must an imagining be 
appropriately tuned.  Let’s call this suggestion COMBO: 
 
COMBO: Imaginative vividness consists in a combination of relevant features, with at least some 
of them rising above a certain threshold 
 
The exact proposal here would need to be fleshed out quite a bit – we need to know quite a bit more 
about the different tuning knobs, so to speak, and their relation to one another.  It might be that an 
imagining still has to rise to a certain, minimal level along each of the various dimensions in order for the 
high degree of one dimension to be able to make up for a deficiency along another dimension.  Or it 
might be that these dimensions don’t receive equal weightings.  Some of them might be more important 
to vivacity, and thus have higher thresholds.  And so on.  But COMBO certainly sounds initially plausible.  
It explains, for example, why a very clear and detailed black and white imagining could be very vivid, 
even though it lacks color, or why a very colorful and bright imagining could be very vivid, even though 
it’s significantly indeterminate.  More generally, by considering all of these relevant features as an 
amalgam, COMBO avoids many of the objections that have arisen when such features are considered in 
isolation from another. 
 
It’s hard to assess COMBO’s plausibility, let alone rule it out, in the absence of a more fully fleshed-out 
proposal, and I haven’t yet found one in the relevant literature – either psychological or philosophical.  
For example, though Cornoldi determines that some of his six highlighted features affect subject’s 
vividness ratings more than others, he describes the “main result” of the research team’s experiments 
regarding vividness was that “all of the six identified characteristics contributed in some way to the 
vividness of the image.”  (Cornoldi 1991: 308).  Obviously, much more would need to be said to flesh out 
a definition like COMBO.  Likewise, Budd suggests that to take vividness “at face value” is to take it as “a 
function of the degree of apparent, brightness, saturation of colour, definiteness of outline, clarity and 
sharpness of focus, and so on.”  (Budd 1989: 104)  Again, simply providing this kind of laundry list is not 
enough to really tell us anything meaningful about vividness.  But doing any more – fleshing out a 
proposal of this sort in any rigorous way – would be an enormously difficult undertaking.  I also suspect 
that it is unlikely to bear fruit.  There’s simply not enough content to the notion of vividness for it to 
withstand precisification in this way. Though we can identify an assortment of individual features that in 
various ways underlie our judgments of vividness, and though we have a reasonably good handle on at 
least some of those individual features, it seems overwhelmingly likely that there is no way to analyze 
the concept of vividness into some combination of those features.14 
                                                             
14 Thomas’ assessment of the empirical research on imagistic vividness seems to be in a similar vein: “Perhaps 
different subjective image features such as clarity, apparent brightness, level of discriminable detail, stability of the 
image (whether it can be held in consciousness for a long time, or quickly fades), and so forth, in fact vary 





In describing our imaginings, there’s no question that we’re inclined to differentiate them from one 
another on grounds of vivacity or vividness, and there’s also no question that, at least typically, we’re 
inclined to treat them as lower in vivacity or vividness than our perceptual experiences.  When pressed 
to say more, we cling to metaphors – the imagining is like a faded photograph or an indistinct xerox.15  If 
we then we push on these metaphors, if we try to understand what they’re really telling us about the 
notion of vividness, we come up largely empty.  About the most we can say is that our vivid imaginings 
are more perception-like than our non-vivid ones, but here too, when pressed to say how they are more 
like perception, we again come up largely empty.16  Ultimately, then, however natural it is to think in 
terms of vividness and vivacity when thinking about our imaginings, it’s not clear that these intuitive 
notions can bear any real weight. 
  
4.  Why it Matters 
 
At this point, as so often happens in philosophical discussion, the “So what?” objection undoubtedly 
rears its head.  So what if these notions are poorly understood?  How does this matter for philosophical 
theorizing?  Unless we’re attempting to defend some kind of Humean taxonomy of ideas and 
impressions – which we’re not – one may wonder how these reflections on the notion of vividness really 
matter.  As I want to suggest in this final section, the unrecognized unclarity in the notion of vividness 
can have unfortunate consequences for attempts to understand both the nature and usefulness of 
imagination.  I will here mention two. 
 
First, while the literature on imagination contains numerous accounts of imagining, there continues to 
be disagreement about its basic nature.  Such disagreement leads to various pernicious results, among 
them the fact that it often seems that there is not a single notion of imagination invoked across 
discussions of imagination in different philosophical contexts.  What philosophers mean by imagination 
in discussions of aesthetics seems fairly different from what philosophers mean by imagination in 
discussions of modal epistemology, and yet both of these seem different yet again from what 
philosophers mean by imagination in discussions of empathy and simulation.17  If we’re to have any 
hope of getting clear about whether and how imagination can play these many different roles, we need 
to be clearer about the nature of imagination.   Granted, an account of the nature of imagination is 
different from an account of the nature of the phenomenology of imagining, and here we’ve been 
focused on the latter.  But insofar there are natural connections between the two, continued reliance on 
                                                             
15 Metaphors like these are invoked in, e.g., Byrne (2011: 118), McGinn (2004: 34). 
16 Might it not be that we’re coming up empty because vividness is simply a primitive notion?  Perhaps the reason 
we can’t find an acceptable analysis of the notion is simply that it is unanalyzable.  While it is hard to know exactly 
how to argue against this kind of suggestion, I’ll here note simply that vividness does not seem to have much in 
common with others notions in which analysis bottoms out – even other such phenomenal notions.  Rather, 
characterizations of vividness seem more like characterizations of detail, brightness, and so on – characterizations 
about which it seems reasonable to expect some explanation could be provided. 
17 For discusssion, see Kind 2013. 
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unclear (or at least, not well understood) notions like vividness in discussions of the phenomenology of 
imagination will likely have adverse effects on our attempt to get clearer on the nature of imagination. 
 
To help elucidate this point, consider one very specific example.  When philosophers invoke imagination 
in discussions of our engagement with works of fiction, it is typically considered important that 
imagination has the power to produce affective responses.  But imagination seems to lack this power 
when it comes to modal epistemology.  In short, we get emotional about literature in a way we don’t 
about thought experiments.  In attempting to account for this difference, one might be tempted to rely 
on an explanation that involves vividness – the more vivid the imagining, perhaps, the more likely it is to 
generate emotion, and imaginings in connection with literature tend to be more vivid than imaginings in 
connection with modal epistemology.  But if the argument of this paper is correct, then it is not clear 
that the notion of vividness could bear this kind of argumentative weight. 
 
The second consequence I will here mention relates to the first.  For in thinking about potential uses of 
imagination, and in thinking about what we can do with imagination, I think we are often guided by 
comparisons between imagination and perception.  Imagination might be thought to play a role in 
modal epistemology and in games of make-believe, for example, because we can’t literally perceive 
unactualized possibilities or the pretend bears.18  In these contexts we must rely on something other 
than perception and, more generally, imagination is thought to operate in contexts where perception 
would be inapplicable.  But this same guiding tendency also suggests that imagination doesn’t – indeed, 
perhaps that it even can’t – operate in contexts in which perception is applicable.  In particular, when it 
comes to gaining knowledge about the world, a domain in which perception features prominently, it 
often seems that imagination has no role to play. 
 
To my mind, this is a mistake, and I’ve elsewhere argued that imagination has more epistemic 
significance than is typically thought (Kind 2016; Kind forthcoming).  Now is not the place to rehearse 
those arguments; for our purposes here what’s important is how a focus on imaginative vividness 
contributes to the denigration of the epistemic significance of imagination.  In short, the more we think 
of imagination as a pale reflection of perception – as a defective or degraded version of it – the more we 
will be disinclined to think that it can teach us anything about the world.  It’s not hard to see how the 
notion of vividness feeds into this.  Were we to have some adequate understanding of the notion of 
vividness, and how the content of visual imaginings differed from the contents of our perceptual 
experiences, then we could address the matter head on.  But absent that, a confused and poorly 
understood notion of vividness simply muddies the water. Though it conveys the suggestion that 
imagination falls short of perception, it fails to give us a real sense of the way in which it falls short, and 
hence fails to give us a real sense of whether the way in which imagination falls short is at all 
epistemically significant. 
 
                                                             
18 For a survey of the role that imagination plays in modal epistemology, see Kung 2016.  For a seminal discussion 
of the role that imagination plays in games of make believe, see Walton 1990. 
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Granted, there are some ways in which imagining falls short of perception that have nothing to do with 
vividness.  In particular, imagination is subject to the will in a way that perception is not, and it is 
therefore not world-sensitive.  This lack of world-sensitivity – the fact that imaginings can depart, even 
wildly, from the world as it is – goes a long way towards explaining why imagination is thought to be 
epistemically irrelevant.  But insofar as there remains a stubborn opposition to the epistemic usefulness 
of imagination even once arguments about its world-insensitivity are addressed, I suspect that other 
factors – factors such as vividness – are likely to be playing some role.19 
 
To re-appropriate a Humean phrase we’ve encountered more than once throughout our discussion 
here, it’s our understanding of the notion of vividness that’s faint and languid.  As this paper has 
suggested, the notion of vividness is poorly understood; perhaps even worse, it seems recalcitrant in the 
face of analysis.  To make philosophical progress on our understanding of imagination, then, we would 
thus do best to retire our reliance on this notion entirely. 20 
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